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EMU-basket and in Amsterdam the rescuing of the
Stability Pact became a more important priority than
further developing CFSP. The agreement on Combined
Joint Task Forces (CJTF) being reached last year at the
Atlantic Council in Berlin is undoubtedly much more
important for European security than the amendments
to Article J.7 of the Treaty on European Union.
The most interesting novelty in the Second Pillar is
probably the increased emphasis on flexibility, made
concrete through the possibility of constructive
abstention. Further enlargement will make it
increasingly difficult, if not impossible for the EU
Member States to speak with one voice. Through
constructive abstention, it should become easier to
take into account the different historical and geographic
interests of the Member States. It is however clear that
when Member States have a vital interest at stake, they
will not resort to abstention but will use their veto.
Constructive abstention can therefore not be expected
to provide a solution for situations of deadlock such as
the one surrounding the recognition of Croatia or
Macedonia. In many cases, it will therefore continue
to be extremely difficult for the Fifteen to agree to
action.
In conclusion, it can be said that despite a number
of institutional adjustments, the Treaty of Amsterdam
in the Second Pillar to a large extent maintains the
status-quo. Increased flexibility might constitute a
step forward but very much will depend on its
implementation. CFSP will continue to be an interesting
forum for cooperation and exchange of views in the
foreign policy area, but it is very doubtful whether
following Amsterdam it will be better prepared for the
type of crises like Yugoslavia or Albania.
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reenters the stage through the backdoor by means of
opt-in and opt-out protocols, temporal clauses, and
even flexible conditions for the ratification of Third
Pillar conventions. Most likely the results achieved by
the Dutch Presidency will give lawyers and
implementing officials in the Member States many
sleepless nights.
A New Title ‘Visas, asylum, immigration and other
policies related to the free movement of persons’
(IIIa)
In the ‘old’ Third Pillar construction, there are nine
matters of common interest. Some of these matters
have been found eligible for transfer to Community
law, namely immigration, asylum, external borders
(Visa Policy) and judicial cooperation in civil matters.
This Title – in which communautarian instruments,
methods of decision-making and legislation will apply
– should enter into force within five years after the
entry into force of the new Title (Article 73i). Taking
account of the eighteen months period required for
ratification, it may last six and a half years before the
provisions in this new Title enter into force. The free
movement of persons may thus only be realized in
2003 or 2004, which is more than a decade past the
previous 1992 deadline.
Even if the Member States succeed in the
progressive establishment of the Free Movement of
Persons Area, free movement will not apply integrally
to the whole EU. Exceptions to the abolition of internal
border controls are made for the United Kingdom and
Ireland (Article 73q). By means of a Protocol on the
The new Treaty of Amsterdam has been characterized
as extraordinarily difficult by dignitaries, journalists
and academics alike. The tremendous complexity of
the Amsterdam Treaty is largely due to the many
changes that were made in the area of Justice and
Home Affairs (JHA) Cooperation. Before Amsterdam,
cooperation in this field was already split between
communautarian and intergovernmental action. In
particular visa policy, fraud, money laundering,
customs cooperation and drugs were topics that were
scattered around in the Treaty. The fragmentation of
some justice and home affairs issues will continue
after Amsterdam. The three main ‘zones’ of cooperation
will be: 1) A New Title ‘Free Movement of Persons,
Asylum and Immigration’, which will eventually be
subject to full Community competence; 2) The
incorporation of the Schengen Acquis into the new
Treaty; and 3) A revamped Third Pillar with provisions
on Police and Judicial Cooperation.
What makes the new Treaty particularly difficult
to read are the many protocols and declarations that
clarify the positions (mostly reservations) of individual
Member States. With this ‘protocolarization’, the tack
has been firmly set on à la carte flexibility: even
though some of the protocols are not enabling clauses
but predetermined limits to integration, some Member
States have effectively been given a wide margin to
determine when they are ready for partial integration.
The incorporation of the Schengen Acquis means the
end of an awkward system of two parallel systems of
governance and hence of multi-speed integration. But
we should not overlook the fact that renewed flexibility9
application of certain aspects of Article 7a of the
Treaty, the two countries have not only secured the
maintenance of their internal border controls, but also
the unscathed continuation of their ‘Common Travel
Area’. This solution is also seen as beneficial for
Spain, because a solution to the dispute about the
status of Gilbraltar does not need to be found
immediately. Another Protocol (‘On the Position of
the United Kingdom and Ireland’), in particular Article
3, leaves the two Member States the space to adopt a
Title IIIa measure. A special protocol on the position
of Denmark has been designed to overcome (expected)
domestic constitutional difficulties, which are
anticipated following the rejection of the Maastricht
Treaty in the first Danish referendum. This protocol
secures Denmark’s national sovereignty regarding the
free movement of persons, which according to chief
negotiator Patijn is a ‘special’ position, with a sort of
‘legal opt-out’ and a ‘political opt-in’.
Furthermore, there is a protocol on the external
relations of the Member States with regard to the
crossing of external borders. The Member States can
negotiate or conclude agreements with third countries
as long as they respect Community Law and other
relevant international agreements. Deeper, or more
intensive cooperation, between Member States and
third states can thus be pursued. The question is
whether the protocol can be interpreted as a pretext for
a divergent set of security standards and arrangements
at the external border of the EU.
The new Title is linked up with one of the objectives
set out in Article B, namely that the Union should be
maintained and developed as an area of freedom,
security and justice, in which the free movement of
persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate
measures with respect to external border controls,
immigration, asylum and the combating of crime. This
link reveals a much clearer correspondence between
free movement of persons and ‘flanking measures’.
The emphasis on security becomes more than obvious
from the French insistence on a declaration relating to
the Schengen protocol, namely that the level of
protection and security within the New Area should
remain the same as under Schengen (Declaration 41).
This possibly implies that Member States who fear
that their internal security is at stake, can reintroduce
internal border controls, which corresponds with Article
2A Schengen Implementing Agreement and which is
similar to what France has done with its northern
borders with Belgium and Luxembourg. The
Amsterdam Treaty does not explicitly state the criteria
of what constitutes a real threat to the internal security
of Member States. In this regard, Article 73l reasserts
the sovereignty of the individual Member States in the
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of
internal security. The Council can decide by qualified
majority (on a proposal from the Commission) to
‘adopt provisional measures of a duration not exceeding
six months for the benefit of the Member States
concerned.’ Such a rule would become operational in
the event of an emergency situation characterized by
a sudden influx of third country nationals (old Article
100C (2)).
Germany, with its major intake of asylum seekers,
has won a case by insisting that the unanimity rule will
not automatically change into a qualified majority
decision-making process once the five years have
subsided (Article 73o). The application of qualified
majority voting will not only be subject to an evaluation
but also to a unanimous decision of the Council as to
whether or not to actually introduce this new method.
The much heralded extension of Community
competence therefore only seems to be a bit of a sop.
This is partially compensated for by the fact that the
right of initiative, which during the initial five years
will be shared between the Member States and the
Commission, will automatically be an exclusive right
for the Commission without further political ado.
The protocol on asylum for nationals of EU Member
States is a blow in the face for human rights
organizations across Europe. Spain had wanted a total
suppression of that right, following the refusal by
Belgium to extradite suspected ETA terrorists. The
Spanish wish has been diluted only to a certain extent
as the final protocol now lists certain conditions under
which an application made by a national of a Member
State may be taken into consideration or declared
admissible. The basic presumption that underlies the
protocol is that all EU Member States are safe countries.
Apparently, the Dutch Presidency proposed, during
the negotiations, amending a passage and adding a
declaration which stipulates that the Protocol would
be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the
1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 New York
protocol. Unfortunately, only Belgium has made a
declaration to this extent. Other EU Member States
should follow this example.
The communautarization of immigration, asylum,
external borders and legal cooperation in civil matters
enhances the role of the institutions more generally.
The European Parliament has to be consulted prior to
the taking of initiatives (Article 73o). The role of the
Court of Justice is expanded if there is no remedy
under national law, the Court may be requested to give
a ruling, but it can only be asked to do so by the highest
judicial authorities in the Member States (Article
73p). Its position is strengthened as the Commission is
enabled to question certain practices.
The Incorporation of Schengen into the New Treaty
The Protocol which integrates the Schengen Acquis
into the framework of the European Union requires
that not only the two Schengen Conventions (1985 and
1990), but also all the decisions of the Executive
Committee (about 200 mostly unpublished decisions),
should be incorporated into the New Treaty. The
Schengen Implementing Convention states that all
rules should be compatible with Community law. But
the question is whether all the decisions by the
Executive Committee are also in line with Community10
law, and whether they have any legally binding force
at all.
The ultimate consequence of the incorporation of
Schengen is that the Acquis will be separated between
the already existing acquis communautaire, the new
Title (see above) and the remaining Third Pillar. Some
parts of Schengen have effectively been encapsulated
by Community directives (firearms, money
laundering). Rules and regulations that relate to visa,
immigration and asylum will in due time be transferred
to the new Title, while provisions concerning executive
cross-border police competences and mutual legal
assistance in criminal matters will stay in the Third
Pillar. For the time being however, the Schengen
arrangements will fall under the Third Pillar unless the
Council decides otherwise (Article 2 Schengen
Protocol).5
It is clear that the Dutch Presidency has been
adamant that more institutional coherence be
guaranteed. The Amsterdam Summit invited the
Council to take appropriate measures as soon as possible
to ensure, as soon as the Treaty enters into force, the
adoption of certain implementing measures relating to
the protocol incorporating the Schengen Acquis into
the Treaty. This includes the integration of the Schengen
Secretariat into the Council’s General Secretariat
(Article 7 Schengen Protocol). Most likely, a special
Committee will be created to deal with the institutional
and legal aspects of the incorporation of Schengen into
the Treaty. The Committee will at least be composed
of members of the Schengen Secretariat, the Secretariat
of the Council and the European Commission, but
individual lawyers (public officials of national
ministries) who have been actively involved in
masterminding this operation may also get a seat on
the Committee.
Exemptions are apparently again the price to be
paid for progress. The UK, Ireland and Denmark
negotiated special provisions. The first two countries
are allowed to opt into certain Schengen provisions,
which can be characterized as a form of differentiated
integration: Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol allows
the UK and Ireland to request ‘at any time’ to take part
in some or all of the provisions of the Schengen
Acquis. This creates a situation in which the two
Member States can maintain its border controls and
deny citizens the freedom to travel, and at the same
time take part in compensatory security arrangements,
such as the Schengen Information System. The balance
between the two constituents seems to have got lost in
the negotiation process. While the UK and Ireland are
allowed to enter Schengen bit by bit, the future EU
Member States will have to accept the Schengen
Acquis in full (Article 8 Schengen Protocol).
The positive side of the integration of Schengen
into the TEU is that we will have one regulatory
régime for internal security management in Europe
instead of two. Nonetheless, as the door has been
opened wide for differentiated integration, there may
be considerable problems at implementation level.
Another risk is the (indirect) contamination effect the
Schengen provisions can have on Community
legislation, as they are mostly negotiated behind closed
doors and with little or no participation of EC
institutions. This contamination effect may be
countered by the formal adoption rules that apply to
the Schengen provisions before they are transformed
into Community rules. The Schengen Protocol is
notoriously vague on this important aspect.
Provisions on Police and Judicial Co-operation in
Criminal Matters
The new Title VI comprises fewer matters of common
interest than its predecessor, but its provisions should
be interpreted as a prelude to intensified cooperation
between police forces, customs authorities and ‘other
competent authorities’ (Article K.1). The latter, rather
open-ended, formulation possibly opens the door to
wider participation of the Secret Intelligence Services
which may imply less transparency. The deepening of
police cooperation finds its basis in a number of new
provisions, the most spectacular of which are the
possibility of having operational cooperation between
competent authorities (Article K.2 (1); the executive
cross-border police competences from the Schengen
Implementing Agreement will most likely be inserted
into this Article), and the assignment of ‘operative’
powers to Europol and joint ‘teams’ (respectively
Article K.2 (2) (a) and (b)). Apparently, the negotiations
on the strengthening of Europol’s powers were quite
arduous. Although politicians have often said that they
absolutely do not want executive powers for Europol
liaison officers, the door has been left ajar for a truly
executive European police agency. This gives rise to
concern, certainly when read in conjunction with the
recently signed protocol that assigns immunity to
Europol liaison officers. The liaison officers will be
subject to fifteen different régimes given the fact that
they and their activities will be under the judicial
review of the competent national authorities only.
Even if these liaison officers have no operational
competences, their role in international intelligence-
gathering can be decisive in court cases against criminal
organizations.
Title VI introduces two new legal instruments,
namely decisions and framework decisions, both of
which have a binding character (Article K.6 (2)(b) and
(c)). Although this implies more distancing from the
legal instruments that were originally introduced under
the umbrella of European Political Cooperation,
considerable vagueness remains about what is to happen
with the old battery of ‘grey’ legal instruments
(conclusions, recommendations, resolutions and
declarations), and whether the Third Pillar Acquis is to
be transferred to the new Title. Although it is not
written in the Treaty, the instruments that were
developed under ‘Maastricht’ are operational under
the rules and conditions of the Maastricht Treaty. The
conventions that are currently under negotiation, such
as Brussels II,6 are problematic because in the new11
situation these instruments will be transferred to the
First Pillar. If they are not ready before the Treaty of
Amsterdam enters into force, these instruments will
have to be redrafted and possibly even be renegotiated.
The revamped Third Pillar assigns a larger role to
the European Court of Justice and the European
Parliament. The competence of the European Court of
Justice (Article K.7) has been widened to more legal
instruments, as it can now also give preliminary rulings
on the validity and interpretation of decisions,
framework decisions and conventions. The matter can
also be arranged by means of declarations that can be
made by individual Member States (Article K.7 (3)).
A precedent for this rule was already created with the
protocol to the Europol Convention, and this type of
arrangement may have an inbuilt capacity to undermine
any general competence that the Court may exercise.
With regard to some of its other competences it is
important to note that an exemption applies, namely
that the Court will not be allowed to review the validity
or proportionality of operations carried out by the
police or other law enforcement agencies (Article K.7
(5)). Hence, official judgements on international
criminal investigation activities will remain a matter
for the national courts and the European Court of
Human Rights.
The European Parliament (Article K.11) will be
consulted by the Council before the adoption of a new
legal instrument (with the exception of common
positions). The EP has to deliver an opinion within
three months or less if so laid down by the Council. It
is expected that the national parliaments will benefit
from this ‘scrutiny reserve’.7 It is also significant that
the EP will have more to say about the operational
expenditure of the Third Pillar budget in its competence
of budget control authority (Article K.13 (3)).
Progress under the Third Pillar has been rather
slow as a consequence of the unanimous voting system
and the time-consuming ratification procedures in the
Member States. The only Convention – which actually
predates Maastricht – which was ready for entry into
force by 1 September 1997, is the Dublin Asylum
Convention. The IGC has come up with a trick to
accelerate the implementation of Conventions. Article
K.6 (d) allows entry into force of a convention once
adopted by at least half of the Member States (unless
conventions provide otherwise). This form of ‘rolling
ratification’ replaces the declarations for the provisional
application of conventions.
And then there is Article K.12 (the former Article
K.7), which authorizes Member States to make use of
institutions, procedures and mechanisms of the
Community if they want to establish closer cooperation.
Article K.12, which should be seen as an enhancement
clause, is considerably longer than the former K.7, and
it is larded with all kinds of ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’. The Justice
and Home Affairs Council may, for instance, refer
authorization to the General Council if one Member
State opposes closer cooperation on the basis of a
qualified majority vote. What scenario did the
negotiators have in mind when they inserted this
condition into the text?
Finally some comforting news for the fans of the
famous bridge-provision in the Third Pillar: the
passerelle has been infused with new life as the old
article K. 9 becomes Article K.14.
Concluding Remarks
Gil-Robles, President of the European Parliament, has
said that the solution chosen for the Third Pillar is
dangerously ambiguous. Intergovernmentalism has
triumphed: it is and will be a policy-making process
strongly dominated by the Council. This can also be
derived from Article 73n, which states that the Council
shall take measures to ensure cooperation between the
relevant departments of the administrations of the
Member States, which can be read as an official
impetus for horizontal networking between national
bureaucracies and as a reassertion of the (already)
strong position of public officials in the Member
States.
The question that poses itself is whether the revision
of JHA cooperation should be interpreted as the
outcome of a belligerent horsetrading exercise. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, every Member State got more or less
what it wanted, perhaps with the exception of Belgium,
which kept insisting on a wider introduction of qualified
majority voting. For the time being, and at least not
until the Treaty is signed and ratified, no radical
changes can be expected within the field of JHA
cooperation. Meanwhile, hectic activity has been taking
place to amend, refine and renumber the draft Treaty
text. Soon after it signature, muscles will be flexed for
the hurdled implementation of the protocols,
declarations, opt-in clauses and the many ‘ifs’ and
‘buts’. ❑
____________________
NOTES
1 Elsewhere in this EIPASCOPE issue, you will find the
contribution of Professor Antonio Bar Cendón, who spoke
about legitimacy of the new EU during the IGC-afternoon.
2 Problems which might result from the improvements in the
fields of free movement of persons, asylum and immigration
are discussed below.
3 It should be noted that the agreement on the reweighting of
votes could be operationalized even without convening a
mini IGC since article 148.2 EC could be amended by any
accession Treaty.
4 A previous version of this text appears in the Maastricht
Journal of European and Comparative Law, 1997, Volume
4, Number 3; a longer, adapted version in Dutch will be
published in the Nederlands Juristenblad. The underlying
text refers to SN 3111/97 (Draft of Amsterdam Treaty in
final form, 11 July 1997).
5 Justice in Europe, Issue 2, 1997, p. 2.
6 Draft Convention on the service in the Member States of the
European Union of judicial and extrajudicial documents in
civil or commercial matters.
7 Justice in Europe, Issue 2, 1997, p. 5. ❑